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1 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined 
agency costs as the sum of (1) monitor- 
ing expenditures to assure that an agent 
is acting in the principal's interests, (2) 
bonding expenditures made by the agent 
to reassure the principal, and (3) the re- 
maining costs due to unresolved conflicts 
between agent and principal (see also 
Barney and Ouchi, 1986: 209-210). 
This paper examines the consequences of symbolic ac- 
tion in corporate governance. Specifically, we examine 
(1) whether the stock market reacts favorably to specific 
governance mechanisms that convey the alignment of 
CEO and shareholder interests, such as the adoption of 
long-term incentive plans (LTIPs), even if such plans are 
not actually implemented, (2) whether providing agency- 
related explanations for LTIPs affects the stock market 
response, and (3) whether the symbolic adoption of 
LTIPs deters other governance reforms that would re- 
duce CEOs' control over their boards. Analysis of data 
from over 400 corporations over a ten-year period sug- 
gests that symbolic corporate actions can engender sig- 
nificant positive stockholder reactions and deter other, 
more substantive governance reforms, thus perpetuating 
power imbalances in organizations. We discuss implica- 
tions for institutional and agency-based perspectives on 
organizations.' 
In recent years, scholarly and popular concern about corpo- 
rate governance arrangements in large corporations has in- 
creased in intensity. Institutional investors and the popular 
business press have decried the apparent absence in many 
corporations of strong governance mechanisms that ad- 
equately promote managerial accountability to stockholders 
(e.g., Charan, 1993; Economist, 1994; Pozen, 1994). This 
concern has been reinforced by extensive academic research 
on the effectiveness of existing governance structures in 
protecting shareholders. Thus, while agency theory suggests 
that managerial incentives and boards of directors represent 
the primary mechanisms by which differences between 
managerial and shareholder interests are minimized (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), a large body 
of empirical research suggests that neither mechanism is 
used sufficiently to represent shareholders. For example, 
research on executive compensation has led many observers 
to conclude that traditional management incentive practices 
are inadequate to reduce agency costs significantly (Finkel- 
stein and Hambrick, 1988).1 Large-scale empirical research 
on corporate boards suggests that boards have traditionally 
lacked the structural power needed to monitor effectively 
(e.g., Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990), and extensive 
qualitative evidence also indicates that boards have often 
been minimally involved in monitoring and controlling man- 
agement decision making (e.g., Mace, 1971; Vance, 1968; 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
This stream of research has bolstered claims by dissatisfied 
shareholders, and institutional investors in particular, that sig- 
nificant changes in governance structure are needed to en- 
hance managerial accountability to shareholders. Several 
changes have gained currency as legitimate improvements in 
corporate governance, such as the adoption of new long- 
term incentive plans that align management compensation 
more closely with stock performance, or changes in board 
structure that increase the board's monitoring and control 
capacity. These changes are seen as increasing top manage- 
ment's attention to shareholders' interests and have been 
advocated by increasingly active investors, represented by 
groups such as the Council of Institutional Investors and the 
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Staw, McKechnie, and Puffer (1983), 
Marcus and Goodman (1991), and Els- 
bach (1994) are exceptions, in part. 
United Shareholders Association, both of which were 
founded in the 1980s (Kim and Ocasio, 1995). Advocates for 
such reforms have also pointed to the extensive empirical 
literature in financial economics that shows positive stock 
market reactions to the adoption of new governance mecha- 
nisms, such as long-term incentive plans. 
Other behaviorally oriented studies, however, have empha- 
sized that while there may be organization-wide benefits to 
such reforms, top managers would prefer to avoid or even 
resist them (Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988; Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Hill and Phan, 1991). Both the economic 
and behavioral literatures on executive compensation sug- 
gest that, ceteris paribus, chief executive officers will prefer 
a pay package with a small pay-for-performance component 
(Zajac and Westphal, 1994). From a normative agency theory 
perspective, CEOs, as risk-averse agents, prefer less risk in 
their compensation contracts (Harris and Raviv, 1979), and 
incentives add uncertainty to a CEO's compensation (Beatty 
and Zajac, 1994). Research from the managerialist perspec- 
tive (Williamson, 1964) suggests that CEOs prefer self-ag- 
grandizing, growth-maximizing oals over profit-maximizing 
goals for their firms and would be reluctant to accept incen- 
tive plans tied closely to profit maximization or to give up 
decision-making autonomy vis-a-vis the board of directors. 
While prior research has tended to emphasize the overtly 
political nature of top executive behavior, Westphal and 
Zajac (1994) and Zajac and Westphal (1995) have recently 
introduced a symbolic management perspective on corporate 
governance (see also Wade, Porac, and Pollock, 1997). They 
suggest that top managers can satisfy external demands for 
increased accountability to shareholders while avoiding un- 
wanted compensation risk and loss of autonomy by adopting 
but not implementing governance structures that address 
shareholder interests and by bolstering such actions with 
socially legitimate language. Their research focused on the 
antecedents of symbolic action, however, and thus did not 
examine either the targeted audience or the likely conse- 
quences of such alleged symbolic actions. An unanswered 
question is: Do symbolic actions in the corporate governance 
domain have any real and measurable impact, and who are 
the stakeholders whose opinions are to be considered? 
The present study makes several contributions. First, we ex- 
tend the corporate governance literature by identifying the 
audience for two forms of symbolic actions relating to corpo- 
rate governance and by measuring two important conse- 
quences. We examine how and why the stock market is 
likely to react positively to the adoption of new long-term 
incentive plans for top management, even if the plans are 
not implemented, and how and why socially legitimate ver- 
bal explanations may also favorably affect the stock market 
response. We then consider whether such symbolic actions 
also have internal consequences by diminishing the likeli- 
hood of other internal governance reforms advocated by in- 
stitutional investors. Such a study, we believe, is unique to 
both the corporate governance area and the more general 
symbolic management and institutional iteratures (e.g., 
Brown, 1994: 861).2 For example, while some symbolic man- 
agement studies have examined how language is used sym- 
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Grants under a performance plan, which 
confer the right to receive shares of com- 
mon stock or cash at a particular date in 
the future to the extent that specific per- 
formance objectives are met, are typically 
made in either shares of common stock 
or stock units, referred to as performance 
shares and performance units, respec- 
tively. The final value of each share is the 
market price at the end of the award pe- 
riod, while each unit is assigned a fixed 
dollar value, unrelated to share price, at 
the beginning of the award period (Crys- 
tal, 1984). 
Symbolic Management 
bolically, they typically have not examined organizational "de- 
coupling," in which formal structures are adopted in 
response to the demands of external stakeholders, but ac- 
tual practices are tailored to the needs or demands of inter- 
nal organization members (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 
1995). As a result, such studies have not been able to rule 
out the possibility that language enhancements may actually 
fit the facts of the situation (Clapham and Schwenk, 1991). 
In our study, we analyze the decoupling of formal structure 
and the use of symbolic language, as well as their conse- 
quences, which allows us both to assess when symbolic 
language does not actually fit the situation and to assess its 
effect. Furthermore, we examine not only how and why de- 
coupling and symbolic language can enhance organizational 
legitimacy, as reflected in stock market reactions, but also 
how they affect organizational power relationships by allow- 
ing powerful organizational actors to exploit and reinforce 
myths about the effectiveness and appropriateness of orga- 
nizational control mechanisms. 
Finally, our study extends agency perspectives in organiza- 
tional research by offering a social interpretation of the 
agency problem. While conventional economic perspectives 
focus on the cost reduction resulting from introducing sub- 
stantive control mechanisms to resolve the conflicting inter- 
ests of agents and principals, we conceive the agency prob- 
lem as one of reducing social uncertainty about the 
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests through 
the introduction of symbolic rather than substantive control 
mechanisms. We test our hypotheses using extensive archi- 
val data from over 400 corporations over a ten-year period. 
ASSESSING THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF AGENCY 
COSTS 
Symbolic Decoupling and Market Reactions 
While studies that examine the effects of symbolic actions 
on stock market reactions are rare, a substantial body of re- 
search in the financial economics literature has examined 
market reactions to a firm's adopting an organizational inno- 
vation; positive market reactions are seen as evidence that 
the adoption of that innovation should result in a perfor- 
mance benefit. In the domain of corporate governance, one 
innovation that has spawned a number of market-reaction 
studies is the adoption of new long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs) for top executives (e.g., Tehranian, Travlos, and Wae- 
gelein, 1987; Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel, 1992). LTIPs are 
defined as new incentive programs that introduce a so-called 
performance plan for top managers (Larcker, 1983).3 
In the financial economics literature, LTIPs are seen as mini- 
mizing the extent to which the interests of agents (top man- 
agement) diverge from those of principals (shareholders) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). LTIPs are expected to 
lengthen executives' time horizons and focus their attention 
on creating shareholder value. A primary difference between 
LTIPs and traditional stock option plans is that LTIP awards 
are contingent on meeting specific performance goals for 
profitability over a three-to-six-year period, whereas stock 
options can be exercised over an extended time regardless 
1 29/ASQ, March 1998 
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An empirical study by Gaver, Gaver, and 
Battistel (1992) is an exception; they did 
not find evidence for a significant stock 
market reaction to LTIP adoption. Kumar 
and Sopariwala (1992: 567) attributed this 
finding, in part, to the smaller size of 
companies in that sample, some portion 
of which appears to include firms outside 
the population of Fortune 1000 compa- 
nies. 
of performance (Larcker, 1983). Compensation consultants 
have touted LTIPs as an important innovation in executive 
pay administration (Crystal, 1984), and Business Week's 
(1996) "Report Card on Corporate Governance" evaluates 
boards on the degree to which they link the CEO's pay to 
specific performance targets, which is precisely what LTIPs 
are supposed to accomplish. Scholars have enumerated a 
variety of other, presumed advantages of LTIPs over stock 
option plans (e.g., Larcker, 1983; Brozovsky and Sopariwala, 
1995). Kumar and Sopariwala (1992: 563) noted that "the 
payoff from stock options is often an imprecise indicator of 
managerial performance because stock prices also depend 
on factors beyond a manager's control." As a result, manag- 
ers concentrate on achieving short-term performance goals 
that are more controllable. In contrast, compensation from 
performance plans, which depends on profitability over a 
multiyear period as well as on stock price, is more directly 
linked to managerial performance than stock option plans, 
encouraging managers to redirect their attention toward 
long-term profitability. 
Given the presumed advantages of LTIPs, it is not surprising 
that most research studies investigating the consequences 
of LTIP adoption have found a positive market reaction to 
the announced adoption of LTIPs (Larcker, 1983; Brickley, 
Bhagat, and Lease, 1985; Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein, 
1987; Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992).4 According to Kumar 
and Sopariwala (1992: 562), "this positive reaction is consis- 
tent with the view that there will be a lower degree of 
agency problems and lower agency costs subsequent to the 
adoption of these plans." In the organizational iterature, 
however, Westphal and Zajac (1994) found that many firms 
announce new LTIPs and then make no grants at all or trivi- 
ally small grants under the plan. One predictor of such de- 
coupling of LTIP adoption and implementation was greater 
CEO influence, relative to the board, over compensation 
policy. Westphal and Zajac (1994) interpreted this as sug- 
gesting that CEOs give in, but only symbolically, to external 
pressure for greater incentive alignment, while minimizing 
the actual compensation risk in their pay packages. 
Thus, while conventional agency perspectives assume that 
stock market reactions to LTIP adoption reflect economic 
benefits from reduced agency costs, a social perspective on 
agency suggests a different interpretation: market reactions 
may instead reflect social benefits resulting from symbolic 
actions that reduce uncertainty about managerial motives. 
Symbolic management scholars and institutional theorists 
have long argued that symbolic actions are most effective 
under conditions of ambiguity or uncertainty (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 1995). Uncertainty in the stock market about manage- 
rial accountability makes it susceptible to the effects of sym- 
bolic action. 
While stock market reactions are viewed in the financial eco- 
nomics literature as providing hard numbers that reflect the 
true underlying value of a firm, from a symbolic perspective, 
firms can also influence market reactions and thus change 
their underlying market value through the use of symbolic 
action. Market reactions thus should perhaps be viewed 
1 30/ASQ, March 1998 
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We do not assume, as a strong-form ef- 
ficiency approach might, that during the 
period covered in this study, investors 
would know (1) that adopted LTIPs were 
often not implemented, (2) that if LTIPs 
were not implemented at the same time 
they were adopted, they were never 
implemented, or (3) that LTIPs that were 
described as addressing agency problems 
were financially no different from LTIPs 
with no agency explanation (Westphal 
and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995). 
Symbolic Management 
more in terms of "soft" numbers that reflect the subjective 
perceptions of a heterogeneous audience, neatly quantified 
and aggregated (Beatty and Zajac, 1987), reacting to changes 
in formal policy that may be independent of substantive 
practices. Symbolic actions such as the adoption (and decou- 
pling) of legitimate formal practices and the use of socially 
accepted language can play a role in the social construction 
of market value. 
Certain features of the stock market make it particularly re- 
ceptive to symbolic action. It is a relatively complex "audi- 
ence" composed of actors ranging from small individual in- 
vestors to immense institutions, with varying levels of 
interest, ranging from passive to active, and with varying lev- 
els of expertise and access to information. Despite the fact 
that such circumstances are not conducive to extensive 
communication and coordination among the disparate sub- 
groups (Baker, 1984), significant collective reactions to ac- 
tions such as LTIP adoption are quantified almost immedi- 
ately. To cope with the quick response times and imperfect 
communication that characterize market reactions to an- 
nounced events, audience members can be expected to es- 
timate how others are likely to respond in determining their 
own response to the current action. Such estimations are 
influenced, in turn, by prior market responses to similar 
events, providing the basis for institutional effects in the 
construction of market value. 
While we do not assume strong-form market efficiency, we 
also do not assume that markets are irrational. Rather, we 
assume that investors are intendedly but boundedly rational 
information processors who are interested in reducing uncer- 
tainty and therefore value socially legitimate indications that 
agency problems are being addressed. This perspective 
helps explain recent survey evidence that "stockholders 
were willing to pay 11 % more on average for companies 
considered well-governed" and that companies seek to 
make governance changes that can "reassure-or at least 
placate-restive investors" (Business Week, 1997: 34). 
The adoption of formal governance reforms may be particu- 
larly effective in enhancing organizational egitimacy by help- 
ing to allay concerns about managerial loyalties, irrespective 
of whether such reforms are actually implemented in the 
organization. As Oliver (1991: 1 55) noted, "from an institu- 
tional perspective . .. the appearance rather than the fact of 
conformity is often presumed to be sufficient for the attain- 
ment of legitimacy." Similarly, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 349) 
suggested that "by designing a formal structure that adheres 
to the prescriptions of myths in the institutional environ- 
ment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on col- 
lectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner." 
The formal adoption of LTIPs serves to promote and rein- 
force the specific notion that a pay-for-performance linkage 
exists for CEOs, while appealing more generally to social 
beliefs about the existence of meritocratic reward structures. 
Thus, the announced introduction of LTIPs for CEOs might 
engender a favorable stock market reaction, regardless of 
whether the plans are actually implemented, because they 
appear to address the specific goals of external constituents 
while also exploiting more general social beliefs.5 Analyzing 
131/ASQ, March 1998 
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decoupling in the adoption and implementation of LTIPs and 
its effect on stock market reactions offers a unique opportu- 
nity to assess quantitatively the consequences of an impor- 
tant form of symbolic management. This suggests the fol- 
lowing: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): LTIP adoption will engender positive stock mar- 
ket reactions, whether or not the plan is implemented. 
Symbolic Explanations and Market Reactions 
While the adoption of formal mechanisms such as LTIPs can 
represent an important form of symbolic action, additional 
communication may also reinforce the symbolic message. 
Corporate leaders use language to emphasize the connection 
between formal structure such as LTIPs and collectively val- 
ued purposes such as reducing agency costs (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977: 349). Such supplemental symbolic communi- 
cation may be particularly valuable for actions such as LTIP 
adoption, given that recent popular discourse on executive 
compensation has sometimes viewed LTIPs more cynically 
as an effort to enrich management at shareholder expense, 
rather than to align pay with performance (Crystal, 1991; 
Business Week, 1992). The use of justifying language may 
encourage more favorable interpretations of organizational 
actions and preempt negative interpretations (Goffman, 
1971; Pfeffer, 1981; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Zajac and 
Westphal (1995: 285) showed that firms commonly provide 
lengthy verbal explanations, like the following, for new LTIPs 
when announcing them in proxy statements: 
Alcoa's Board of Directors has decided to place an increasing share 
of management's overall compensation at risk rather than in fixed 
salaries. The new approach to compensation was recommended by 
the Board's compensation committee, which is composed solely of 
outside directors. The board believes that granting stock options, 
performance shares and [bonuses] will create a more appropriate 
relationship between compensation and the financial performance 
of the company in order to increase key employees' personal finan- 
cial identification with interests of the Company's stockholders. 
(Aluminum Company of America, 1988) 
This example illustrates what Zajac and Westphal (1995: 
288) called the "agency explanation," which they suggested 
is the most frequently used explanation for LTIPs adopted in 
the 1980s. The agency logic emphasizes explicitly how LTIPs 
promote shareholder interests by tying CEO compensation 
more closely to shareholder wealth. Several authors have 
noted the growing prominence and acceptance of agency 
theoretic perspectives in the academic and managerial litera- 
tures on corporate governance (Davis and Thompson, 1994; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995). This institutionalization of the 
agency logic can reinforce the tendency for boundedly ratio- 
nal external constituents to respond favorably to the adop- 
tion of LTIPs when it is accompanied by an agency explana- 
tion. LTIP explanations invoking an agency logic can be 
characterized as enhancements (Tedeschi and Melburg, 
1984) that build the perceived desirability of LTIP adoption 
by invoking notions of managerial incentive alignment, com- 
pensation risk, and shareholder identification as legitimate 
rationales for long-term incentive compensation. We exam- 
ine whether such symbolic language enhancements affect 
the stock market reactions to LTIP adoption. 
132/ASQ, March 1998 
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6 
Schlenker (1980: 6) defined impression 
management as "the conscious or un- 
conscious attempt to control images that 
are projected in real or imagined social 
interactions." 
Symbolic Management 
A few studies in the institutional and impression manage- 
ment literatures have found evidence for reputational ben- 
efits from the use of enhancements or related communica- 
tions (e.g., Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Bielby and Bielby, 
1994; Elsbach, 1994).6 Nevertheless, while the business 
press occasionally provides vivid accounts of how top man- 
agers may influence stock prices via symbolic management 
(e.g., Wall Street Journal, 1994, 1995), systematic empirical 
examination of this phenomenon is relatively rare in the or- 
ganizational iterature. Furthermore, prior symbolic manage- 
ment studies have typically not explored whether verbal en- 
hancements or justifications fit the facts of the situation. 
Clapham and Schwenk (1991: 221) noted that verbal en- 
hancements may generate favorable stock market reactions 
simply because they "accurately reflect causal relation- 
ships." We test whether market reactions to verbal accounts 
reflect actual organizational practices by examining reactions 
when LTIPs are announced and implemented and when they 
are announced but not implemented. Observing a positive 
market reaction to agency explanations even when LTIP 
adoption is decoupled from actual implementation would 
provide stronger evidence that verbal enhancement in proxy 
statements represents symbolic management and not 
merely rational communication or persuasion (cf. Porter, 
Allen, and Angle, 1981). Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): LTIP adoption with an agency explanation will 
engender more positive stock market reactions than LTIP adoption 
without an agency explanation, whether or not the plan is imple- 
mented. 
Substituting Symbolic Incentives for Substantive Board 
Structure Changes 
While the two hypotheses offered above address an impor- 
tant possible consequence of the symbolic use of LTIPs, 
such consequences may not be limited to a positive stock 
market reaction. The decoupling of LTIP adoption from 
implementation and the use of socially legitimate explana- 
tions can relieve pressures that firms face from shareholder 
groups to enact other governance reforms. By using sym- 
bolic action to reduce the social uncertainty regarding the 
divergence of managerial and shareholder interests, such 
symbolic action substitutes for other governance mecha- 
nisms. Recent empirical research has provided evidence of a 
substitution effect between the substantive use of top man- 
agement incentives (including LTIPs) and the use of board 
monitoring mechanisms (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1994). Drawing from normative agency theory 
(Holmstrom, 1979), Zajac and colleagues suggested that 
managerial incentive alignment and board monitoring repre- 
sent alternative solutions to the agency problem, such that 
shareholders' concerns for greater board monitoring capacity 
decline as managerial incentive alignment increases. The 
substitution effect between incentives and monitoring 
should also exist in the domain of symbolic control, because 
it would reduce social uncertainty about the agency problem. 
By formally adopting "institutionally 'correct' procedures" 
(Walsh and Seward, 1990: 431) indicative of CEO account- 
ability, top managers may effectively preempt or forestall 
alternative changes in board structure that are less easily 
133/ASQ, March 1998 
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decoupled from substantive arrangements. In effect, sym- 
bolic CEO incentive alignment may represent an important 
and subtle entrenchment device, perpetuating the CEO's 
dominance over the board. 
We examine whether symbolic LTIP adoption alleviates 
shareholder pressures for two specific changes in board 
structure thought to increase board control: separation of the 
CEO and board chair positions and increases in the ratio of 
outside to inside directors. Institutional investors and advo- 
cates of board reform have pressured firms to separate the 
CEO and board chair positions as a means of improving 
board monitoring and control of management decisions (For- 
tune, 1984; Pozen, 1994). In general, governance research- 
ers and the business press have agreed that allocating the 
two positions to separate individuals enhances the board's 
ability to monitor and control management independently 
(Crystal, 1991; Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Beatty and Zajac,, 
1994; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). CEOs holding both po- 
sitions are viewed as able to suppress open challenges to 
their decision making in board meetings more easily (West- 
phal and Zajac, 1994). Given that the board chair is nominally 
responsible for monitoring and evaluating CEO decision mak- 
ing, uniting both roles in one person represents a formalized 
conflict of interest. 
With respect to outside directors, stockholder groups such 
as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CALP- 
ERS) and other large pension funds have consistently advo- 
cated increases in the ratio of outsiders to insiders as a 
source of increased board control over top management 
(New York Times, 1992; Useem, 1993; Pozen, 1994). While 
both inside and outside directors are responsible for over- 
seeing corporate strategy, governance scholars and advo- 
cates of board reform have long argued that outsiders are 
better able to evaluate strategic decision making objectively 
(Vance, 1968; Brudney, 1982; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In- 
siders are subordinate to the CEO and are therefore typically 
viewed as unwilling or unable to present a serious challenge 
to the CEO's opinion on strategic issues in board meetings 
(Kesner and Johnson, 1990). In addition, to the extent that 
manager-directors hold certain preferences in common with 
the CEO, such as a desire to minimize employment risk 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981), they may be more likely to agree 
with the CEO's position. By symbolically reducing the per- 
ceived divergence between managerial and shareholder in- 
terests (e.g., adopting LTIPs without implementing them), 
however, CEOs can alleviate pressure from shareholders ei- 
ther to separate the CEO and board chair positions or to in- 
crease the outsider ratio. This suggests the following hy- 
pothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): LTIP adoption will be negatively related to (1) 
subsequent separation of the CEO and board chair positions and (2) 
increases in the ratio of outside to inside directors, whether or not 
the plan is implemented. 
Similarly, the use of socially legitimate explanations should 
also help alleviate shareholder pressure to make changes in 
board structure that increase control over management. Ex- 
planations that present LTIPs as a control mechanism de- 
signed to align management and shareholder interests con- 
1 34/ASQ, March 1998 
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Symbolic Management 
veys the sense that the board has acted to exercise control 
over management on behalf of shareholders, thus reducing 
the perceived need for specific changes in board structure 
that serve the same purpose. Accordingly, an agency expla- 
nation for LTIP adoptions should diminish external pressure 
for separation of the CEO and board chair positions or in- 
creases in the outsider ratio, irrespective of whether the 
plans are actually implemented: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): LTIP adoption with an agency explanation will 
amplify the negative relationship between adoption and (1) subse- 
quent separation of the CEO and board chair positions, and (2) in- 
creases in the ratio of outside to inside directors, whether or not 
the plan is implemented. 
Symbolic Substitution and Institutional Investors 
While our discussion thus far has treated shareholders as 
having homogeneous preferences, institutional investors rep- 
resent an important subgroup of owners who typically hold 
significantly larger equity stakes in corporations than do indi- 
vidual shareholders. One important implication of holding 
such large equity stakes is that for dissatisfied institutional 
investors, the option of "exit" (i.e., selling the stock) is 
somewhat more difficult and costly, hence leading to the 
greater exercise of "voice" (Hirschman, 1970; Jensen, 1989; 
Kim and Ocasio, 1995). Since institutional investors are virtu- 
ally always explicit about not wanting to manage the large 
U.S. companies in which they invest, their voice is often ex- 
pressed in terms of seeking governance changes to ensure 
that managerial interests do not dominate shareholder inter- 
ests. Given that constrained exit options make changes in 
corporate governance practices more salient to institutional 
investors, it is not surprising that much of the recent pres- 
sure for governance reform, such as separating the CEO and 
board chair positions and increasing the outsider ratio, has 
been generated by institutional investors (Pozen, 1994). 
While this suggests that firms with greater institutional own- 
ership would thus be more likely to push for such gover- 
nance reforms, this tendency should be diminished to the 
extent that symbolic actions, such as the adoption of LTIPs 
without implementation and the use of agency explanations, 
are provided as symbolic substitutes. This suggests the fol- 
lowing additional hypotheses related to H3 and H4: 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): LTIP adoption will interact with ownership by 
institutional investors to diminish the likelihood of (1) subsequent 
separation of the CEO and board chair positions and (2) increases in 
the ratio of outside to inside directors, whether or not the plan is 
implemented. 
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): The use of agency explanations for LTIP 
adoption will interact with ownership by institutional investors to 
diminish the likelihood of (1) subsequent separation of the CEO and 
board chair positions and (2) increases in the ratio of outside to in- 
side directors, whether or not the plan is implemented. 
METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
The initial sample frame for this study included large and 
medium-sized U.S. industrial and service firms listed in the 
1982 Forbes and Fortune 500 indexes. The final sample in- 
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cluded all companies for which complete data on board 
structure, CEO compensation, and stock market reactions 
were available. This criterion yielded 408 companies. T-tests 
revealed that companies in this sample were not significantly 
different in sales or profitability (return on assets) from com- 
panies in the larger population. Data were collected for the 
years 1982 to 1992, and LTIP adoptions are observed from 
1985 to 1991, inclusive, because the lag structure requires 
collecting data for the earlier and later time periods. We 
chose this time frame because institutional investors have 
exerted increased pressure for greater management ac- 
countability to shareholders during this period (Davis and 
Thompson, 1994). 
We collected data on LTIP adoption and implementation 
from corporate proxy statements and information on board 
structure from both proxies and Standard & Poor's Register 
of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. Data on institu- 
tional ownership came from the Compact Disclosure data 
base, supplemented by data from a large management con- 
sulting firm. Finally, data on stock market reactions, firm 
size, and profitability were provided by COMPUSTAT and the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Independent Variables 
LTIP adoption. We defined LTIP adoption as the addition of 
a new performance plan that aimed at providing multiyear 
performance incentives, such as performance shares or per- 
formance units, to a CEO's compensation contract. Thus, 
amendments or updates to existing performance plans were 
excluded. We carefully analyzed proxies before and after the 
LTIP adoption date to confirm the newness and uniqueness 
of coded LTIP adoptions. A substantive LTIP adoption is one 
in which firms adopted and also announced grants under the 
plan, and a symbolic LTIP adoption is one in which firms 
adopted an LTIP in a particular year but did not announce 
grants of any of the incentive vehicles included under the 
plan, consistent with Westphal and Zajac (1994). Given that 
payouts of restricted stock are not contingent on firm perfor- 
mance (Crystal, 1991), stand-alone restricted stock plans 
were not considered LTIPs. A new LTIP and any initial grants 
from the plan are typically announced at the same time, in 
the same proxy statement. This is to be expected, since 
firms intending to use the plan have no obvious reason to 
delay implementation until later years. We checked for 
grants from the year of adoption to the end of the time pe- 
riod studied and found that all firms in our sample that made 
grants under their plans did so at the same time the LTIP 
was adopted. Also, one of our analyses measures stock mar- 
ket reactions over the subsequent 390-day period (as dis- 
cussed below), and that analysis would capture reactions to 
any grants announced in the following year's proxy state- 
ment. LTIP grants ranged from 2 percent of total compensa- 
tion to 93 percent, with a mean of 26 percent. 
We used the two categories of adoption (symbolic or sub- 
stantive) to create subgroups in the stock market analyses 
(H1) and to create two dummy variables in the analyses to 
isolate the effects of symbolic and substantive LTIP adop- 
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Symbolic Management 
tions (the base case is no LTIP adoption) on other gover- 
nance changes (H3). 
Agency explanations. To determine the presence or ab- 
sence of agency explanations for new LTIPs, we conducted 
a basic content analysis of proxy statements in the year of 
adoption (Holsti, 1968; Weber, 1985; Zajac and Westphal, 
1995). New LTIPs are typically announced to shareholders in 
a separate section of the proxy statement. In addition to de- 
scribing the plan, these announcements may include an in- 
troductory section outlining the rationale for adopting it. Al- 
though explanations are nearly always confined to this 
portion of the proxy statement, we nevertheless carefully 
checked the entire compensation section of each proxy for 
any references to the new plan. 
We decided not to furnish coders with an exhaustive rule 
book dictating the categorization of every possible phrase or 
combination of phrases; Holsti (1968) noted that such codiing 
strategies can artificially inflate reliabilities while sacrificing 
the content validity of the coding scheme. Accordingly, we 
simply provided coders with a summary description of the 
agency perspective, including a short list of key concepts 
characterizing the theory, and specific coding instructions, 
consistent with Zajac and Westphal (1995). The coders in- 
cluded an undergraduate student and two doctoral students 
in business. We asked coders to determine whether an 
agency explanation was present anywhere in the proxy. 
Thus, the "recording unit" (i.e., the unit of analysis) is the 
entire proxy statement. Pre-negotiation interceder reliabilities 
were very high, with Pearson correlation coefficients ranging 
from .903 to .972 and an intercoder agreement rate of 95 
percent, suggesting minimal ambiguity in the coding 
scheme. Forty-nine percent of the proxy statements included 
an agency explanation. Zajac and Westphal's (1995) analysis 
showed that "human resource explanations," which empha- 
size how LTIPs help to retain scarce leadership talent, were 
most prevalent earlier in the time period. They found that 
over 90 percent of adopting firms providing an explanation 
for new LTIPs used one or both of these explanations exclu- 
sively. They also found that the agency explanation did not 
reflect any difference in the actual incentive compensation 
plans, which lends credence to their contention that the lan- 
guage chosen was largely symbolic. 
We used the categorization of agency explanation or no 
agency explanation to create subgroups in the stock market 
analyses (H2) and to create dummy variables in the analyses 
that predicted governance changes (H4). In effect, H4 pre- 
dicts an interaction effect between symbolic or substantive 
adoption and the use of agency explanations on the likeli- 
hood of board changes. The product-term approach cannot 
be used to test the interaction between dichotomous vari- 
ables (Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan, 1990). Thus, to test 
whether LTIP adoption has stronger effects on board 
changes when an agency explanation is used, whether or 
not the plans were implemented, we created separate di- 
chotomous variables for the four different categories of 
adoption: (1) substantive LTIP adoption with agency explana- 
tion; (2) substantive LTIP adoption without agency explana- 
tion; (3) symbolic LTIP adoption with agency explanation; and 
137/ASQ, March 1998 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:28:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
(4) symbolic LTIP adoption without agency explanation. The 
base case is no adoption, as there can be no agency expla- 
nation without adoption. H4 is thus supported if variables (1) 
and (3) are stronger predictors of board changes than vari- 
ables (2) and (4). 
Other independent variables. Institutional ownership was 
measured as equity held by pension funds, banks and trust 
companies, savings and loans, mutual fund managers, and 
labor union funds divided by total common stock (Hansen 
and Hill, 1991). We used this variable in interaction terms 
with the LTIP adoption and LTIP explanation variables to test 
H3a and H4a, respectively. 
Control variables. Given some evidence linking poor firm 
performance to changes in governance structure, including 
separation of the CEO and board chair positions (Harrison, 
Torres, and Kukalis, 1988) and the likelihood of appointing 
outsiders to the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), we 
included a measure of operating profits (return on assets) in 
models predicting increased structural board control over 
management. Moreover, although the evidence is mixed, 
several studies have shown relationships between firm size 
and board monitoring or control capacity (e.g., Beatty and 
Zajac, 1994; Finkelstein and D'Aveni, 1994). Thus, we also 
included log of sales in models predicting greater structural 
board control. 
Given that prior levels of board control might influence sub- 
sequent changes in board structure, as well as the stock 
market reaction to LTIP adoption, we controlled for prior 
board control in all models. We used the following com- 
monly used indicators of board control (cf. Zajac and West- 
phal, 1995): (1) relative stock ownership by outsiders, calcu- 
lated as the percentage of total common stock owned by 
outside directors (Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994); 
(2) the portion of the board appointed after the CEO; (3) the 
ratio of outside to inside directors; and (4) CEO/board-chair 
separation, which we excluded from models predicting sepa- 
ration of the CEO and board chair position, since only firms 
with combined CEO/board chair positions are at risk of sepa- 
ration. We combined these variables into a single measure 
using principal components analysis (Jackson, 1991). The 
results of this analysis yielded only one eigenvalue greater 
than one, and the scree plot also suggested that only this 
first component should be retained. We also estimated sepa- 
rate models of change in the outsider ratio, in which the 
prior ratio of outside to inside directors was included in the 
model separately from the other measures of prior board 
control, and the results were substantively unchanged. 
Existing incentive arrangements might also influence market 
reactions to LTIP adoption or the likelihood of subsequent 
changes in board structure. Thus, given that stock options 
were the principal form of long-term incentive compensation 
used at most companies prior to the adoption of LTIPs (Ellig, 
1984), we controlled for prior stock option grants, measured 
as the average total value of stock options granted over the 
prior two-year period divided by average total compensation 
over that period. We measured option grants over a two- 
year period because grants are sometimes made on a bi- 
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Symbolic Management 
annual basis. Options were valued using the Black-Scholes 
method. We also ran three sets of supplementary analyses 
in which we controlled for the adoption of another long-term 
incentive plan and change in board control (using the four 
measures discussed above), with these variables measured 
for one of the following three time periods: (1) year t (the 
year of LTIP adoption), (2) year t+1, or (3) year t through year 
t+1. These analyses assess whether any effects of symbolic 
LTIP adoption result from the simultaneous or subsequent 
adoption of other changes in board composition or incentive 
compensation. The results were substantively unchanged 
from the results presented below. Moreover, these control 
variables were negatively correlated with symbolic LTIP 
adoption. We also ran separate analyses including dummy 
variables for primary, two-digit Standard Industrial Classifica- 
tion codes and found that controlling for industry differences 
had essentially no effect on the results. 
We controlled for time effects by including dummy variables 
for each year in the event history analyses (given the large 
number of year dummies, coefficients for these variables are 
not reported in the tables). Descriptive statistics are provided 
in table 1. 
Dependent Variables 
Stock market reaction. We followed standard event study 
methodology (Patell, 1976; Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992) in 
measuring stock market reactions to LTIP adoption with ex- 
cess stock returns, or the cumulative difference between a 
firm's observed return and its expected return during a 
specified period surrounding adoption. As Lubatkin et al. 
(1989) noted, excess returns provided by CRSP are superior 
to simple abnormal returns in at least two respects: (1) they 
are corrected for biases resulting from nonsynchronous trad- 
ing (Brown and Warner, 1985), and (2) they compare the 
firm's returns to a market portfolio of firms with similar 
betas, rather than an overall market-wide average, thus con- 
trolling for various extraneous influences on market returns 
that may be correlated with systematic risk. 
As many authors have noted, a general limitation to event 
study methodology is the difficulty in defining precisely the 
time window during which information about an event be- 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. 
Symbolic LTIP adoption .52 .50 
Substantive LTIP adoption .48 .50 
Symbolic adoption with an agency explanation .27 .44 
Symbolic adoption without an agency explanation .25 .43 
Substantive adoption with an agency explanation .22 .42 
Substantive adoption without an agency explanation .26 .44 
Institutional ownership .34 .22 
Prior CEO/board power .00 1.06 
Prior stock option grants .25 .37 
Return on assets .06 .06 
Log of sales 7.91 1.22 
CEO/board chair separation .05 .22 
Increased outsider ratio .03 .08 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that some 
firms retain departing CEOs as board 
chairs for a period of time after succes- 
sion to smooth the transition between 
regimes (Vancil, 1987). In such cases, 
external pressure from shareholders may 
be less directly relevant to separation of 
the CEO and board chair positions. The 
results reported below, however, re- 
mained unchanged when we removed 
these cases from the analysis. 
comes known to the market. In general, long observation 
windows take into account the potential for information leak- 
age prior to the event date or the possibility of gradual diffu- 
sion of information after the event date. Short observation 
windows, in contrast, reduce the likelihood of contamination 
from extraneous organizational events during the time pe- 
riod. We used multiple observation windows in this study to 
ensure that results were not dependent on a particular set of 
assumptions about information disclosure to the market. We 
cumulated returns over four different time intervals, three of 
which are commonly used in the event study literature 
(Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease, 1985; Kumar and Sopariwala, 
1992; Worrell, Davidson, and Glascock, 1993): 2 days (t-1 to 
to), 11 days (t-5 to t+5), and 31 days (t-5 to t+25). We also 
recognize that some studies have examined cumulative ab- 
normal returns over a much longer period (e.g., 12 months) 
to assess whether positive returns dissipate over time or 
whether they constitute relatively permanent, long-lasting 
reevaluations of the company and its stock (cf. Dodd and 
Ruback, 1977; Bradley, 1980; Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 
1983). Thus, in the interest of thoroughness, we also exam- 
ined cumulative excess returns over the subsequent year 
(t-5 to t+385). 
Following Kumar and Sopariwala (1992), we observed ex- 
cess returns from the proxy mailing date, or the date on 
which the LTIP announcement was sent to shareholders. 
While some researchers have observed returns from the 
date of the annual board meeting (e.g., Gaver, Gaver, and 
Battistel, 1992), Brickley (1986) found evidence for an annual 
meeting effect that could contaminate results of an event 
study: for a random sample of firms, he found a positive 
stock market reaction over the two-day period following the 
annual meeting, but no such effect for the proxy mailing 
date. Moreover, the proxy mailing date is the most com- 
monly chosen date for this kind of study (Brickley, 1986: 
346). Nevertheless, we also conducted separate analyses 
using the stamp date, or the date on which the proxy is reg- 
istered as having been received by the Securities and Ex- 
change Commission (Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel, 1992). The 
results were substantively unchanged from the findings pre- 
sented below. 
Increased board control structure. To analyze the likelihood 
of separating the CEO and board chair positions (CEO/board 
chair separation), we created a dichotomous variable for 
each year, coded as 1 if the positions were separate in the 
subsequent year, t+1, but not in the current year, and 0 oth- 
erwise.7 We measured increases in the ratio of outside to 
inside directors (increased outsider ratio) by subtracting the 
ratio in the current year from the ratio in the subsequent 
year. 
Analysis 
Analyzing stock market reactions. To test whether sym- 
bolic LTIP adoption and verbal enhancement in proxy state- 
ments generate favorable stock market responses, we calcu- 
lated average cumulative excess returns over the time 
intervals discussed above for all adopting firms, as well as 
for the following subgroups: substantive adopters, symbolic 
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adopters (those adopting but not implementing new plans), 
substantive adopters providing an agency explanation, sym- 
bolic adopters providing an agency explanation, substantive 
adopters not providing an agency explanation, and symbolic 
adopters not providing an agency explanation. To assess the 
significance of excess returns for each group, we used the 
following test statistic suggested by Brown and Warner 
(1985: 7): 
At I S(At), 
where At is the average cumulated excess return over the 
relevant observation period, and S(A) is the time-series stan- 
dard deviation of excess returns over a 238-day estimation 
period. When average excess returns are independent, iden- 
tically distributed, and normal, this statistic has a student-t 
distribution under the null hypothesis. Moreover, simulation 
studies suggest that this test statistic is well-specified for 
samples of 50 or more and for observation periods of varit 
ous lengths (Dodd and Warner, 1983; Brown and Warner, 
1985). This estimation approach is used in most of the prior 
event studies of LTIP adoption and has become a standard 
event methodology in the financial economics literature 
(Brickley, 1986; Kumar and Sopariwala, 1992). 
Analyzing increased board control structure. We assessed 
the effects of symbolic LTIP adoption on the likelihood of 
CEO/board chair separation and increases in the outsider ra- 
tio with discrete-time event history analysis (Allison, 1982; 
Yamaguchi, 1991) and pooled cross-sectional time series re- 
gression analysis, respectively (Sayrs, 1989). In these mod- 
els, the independent variables are measured over the prior 
three-year period. Thus, for instance, the models assess the 
increased likelihood of change in board structure in a given 
year (t) if firms adopted an LTIP (of various kinds) sometime 
during the prior three years (t-3 to t1). We used a multiyear 
period because employment contracts for directors limit the 
ability of firms to change board composition immediately, for 
example, in response to greater or lesser pressure from in- 
vestors. For instance, if directors have employment con- 
tracts that expire between one and three years into the fu- 
ture, a board planning to make significant alterations in board 
composition that involve changing multiple positions may 
have to implement this change over several years. Given this 
data structure, we observed changes in board structure from 
1985 to 1992, yielding 3,264 firm-years of data. In separate 
analyses, we examined whether the results were sensitive 
to this particular lag structure by examining the effect of 
LTIP adoption over a more recent, two-year period (t-2 to 
t-1) and over a four-year period (t-4 to t_). The results pre- 
sented below were substantively unchanged, suggesting 
that our findings are not sensitive to the particular lag struc- 
ture used in the models. 
The discrete-time event history model can be expressed in 
the following, logistic regression form (Allison, 1984): 
log{Pi(t) / [1 -Pi(t)]} = a + bkXik(t), 
where PA(t) is the probability of CEO/board chair separation or 
an increase in the outsider ratio in year t, XYk5 are time-vary- 
ing cvariates hypothesized to influence the "risk" or likeli- 
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hood of change, and bks are the estimated coefficients. 
Moreover, Pi is defined as: 
exp[bkXik(t)I / (1 + exp[bkXik(t)I, 
such that Pi(t) increases monotonically with bkXik(t) and can 
assume any value between zero and one. With time-varying 
covariates, a firm's likelihood of change is updated over time 
as the values of independent and control variables change. 
All independent and control variables were lagged by one 
year. The year dummy variables included in all models con- 
trolled for unspecified, time-specific factors (Allison, 1982, 
1984). Clogg and Eliason (1987) have shown that discrete- 
time models provide an adequate approximation of continu- 
ous-time models, which estimate instantaneous rates of 
change, when the conditional probability of event occurrence 
is 0.1 or less. Conditional probabilities are less than 0.1 for 
both CEO/board chair separation and increases in the out- 
sider ratio. 
We modeled only the likelihood of the first event during the 
time period, removing the firm from the risk set following 
change, because we assume that increasing board control 
through structural change reflects a relatively fundamental 
and long-lasting change in shareholders' expectations about 
the board's role in controlling management (Useem, 1993). 
Consistent with this assumption, there were only 17 rever- 
sals in board structure during the period of study, represent- 
ing less than 5 percent of all changes. In effect, this model 
examines the role of symbolic LTIP adoption in forestalling a 
lasting shift in the board's orientation toward management. 
To correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in mod- 
eling change in the ratio of outside to inside directors, we 
used GLS pooled cross-sectional time series regression 
analysis. This model can be expressed in the following equa- 
tion: 
B = (X'S1X)1X'S1Y, 
given 
Y = XntBk + unt, with unt = vt += un+ ent, 
where B equals the vector of regression coefficients, X is 
the vector of exogenous variables, and unt is the error term, 
divided into serial, cross-sectional, and combined serial and 
cross-sectional components: vt are random over time, un are 
random over cross sections (i.e., companies), e are random 
over space and time. S is the sum of the variances of the 
three error components (Sayrs, 1989). 
RESULTS 
Results of the event study are presented in table 2. The re- 
sults in column 1 indicate significantly positive excess re- 
turns for all adopting firms across all four time intervals, pro- 
viding consistent evidence for a favorable stock market 
reaction to LTIP adoption, but the results reported in col- 
umns two and three of table 2 support H1, which predicted 
that firms would experience a positive stock market reaction 
to LTIP adoption, whether or not the plans were imple- 
mented. Excess returns are significantly positive for substan- 
tive adopters and for symbolic adopters across all four inter- 
vals examined. 
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This analysis does not rule out the possi- 
bility that firms might experience a favor- 
able stock market reaction when provid- 
ing any type of explanation for the LTIPs, 
but results of separate analyses indicated 
that excess returns were not significant 
for the subset of adopting firms that pro- 
vided another, non-agency explanation for 
LTIP adoption. 
Symbolic Management 
H2 predicted that when an LTIP adoption is accompanied by 
an agency explanation emphasizing the role of LTIPs in align- 
ing CEO compensation with shareholder interests, it would 
engender a more favorable stock market response, irrespec- 
tive of whether the adoption was substantive or symbolic. 
Results in table 2 on excess returns for cases of LTIP adop- 
tion with and without an agency explanation provide strong 
and consistent evidence for H2: LTIP adoptions providing an 
agency explanation elicit more positive stock market reac- 
tions than LTIP adoptions without an agency explanation, 
and this holds true for both symbolic and substantive adop- 
tions. T-tests indicated highly significant differences between 
symbolic adoption with an agency explanation and symbolic 
adoption without an agency explanation for each of the four 
time windows; values ranged from 8.69 to 11.98.8 The fact 
that LTIP adoptions without an agency explanation show 
weaker positive excess returns should not be interpreted as 
suggesting that verbal explanations are more important than 
LTIP adoption. LTIP adoption, whether substantive or sym- 
bolic, is a prerequisite to providing an agency explanation, 
since such explanations point specifically to the LTIP adop- 
tion event in claiming that the firm has reduced the diver- 
gence in managerial and shareholder interests through in- 
creased incentive alignment. Also, as Jaccard, Turrisi, and 
Wan (1990: 14-15) noted in their discussion of main effects 
and interaction effects, knowing that a positive relationship 
between X and Y (i.e., LTIP adoption and stock market reac- 
tions) is greater in the presence of Z (i.e., agency explana- 
tions) does not "diminish the utility of the information" that 
there is an average main effect. The results in table 2 show 
that symbolic LTIP adoption leads to positive excess returns 
(H1) and that the presence of the agency explanation is a 
powerful moderator of that positive relationship. 
Although our hypotheses were limited to symbolic action, 
this pattern of results also applies to substantive LTIP adop- 
tion, which is also as we would expect. Our prediction is not 
that symbolic actions will have a larger impact on stock price 
than substantive ones but, rather, that they too can have a 
significant effect on stock price. While the results show that 
Table 2 
Mean Cumulative Excess Returns Surrounding LTIP Adoption: Substantive and Symbolic Adoptions with 
and without Agency Explanations* 
With Agency Explanations Without Agency Explanations 
Interval All Substantive Symbolic Substantive Symbolic Substantive Symbolic 
(days) adoptions adoptions adoptions adoptions adoptions adoptions adoptions 
-1 toO 2.00- -1.85-- 2.13-- 2.1500 2.83000 1.44- 1.37 
(.78) (.71) (.84) (.78) (.80) (.81) (.89) 
-5 to +5 1.9600 2.12000 1.79 2.31000 2.44000 1.22- 1.16 
(.65) (.59) (.99) (.63) (.67) (.69) (.70) 
-5 to +25 .96-- .86- 1.15 2.19000 2.04000 73 .79 
(.46) (.45) (.52) (.55) (.49) (.48) (.54) 
-5 to +385 1.99- 1.59- 1.96 2.3100 2.5300 .98 .91 
(.84) (.77) (.90) (.87) (.87) (.88) (.97) 
N 197 95 102 44 53 51 49 
* ?< .05; *-p < .01; *--p ? .001. 
* Excess returns are expressed as a percentage; standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Moreover, in a separate model we esti- 
mated the interaction between time of 
adoption and the use of an agency expla- 
nation on excess returns and found a 
positive but only marginally significant 
(p < .10) interaction, suggesting that 
agency explanations do not become 
much more (or less) effective in influenc- 
ing the market's response to LTIP adop- 
tion over the period of this study. This is 
not surprising, because our prior research 
would suggest that agency explanations 
had already acquired considerable legiti- 
macy by the mid-1 980s (Zajac and West- 
phal, 1995). 
agency explanations also accentuate the market's response 
to substantive adoption, the significant hypothesized effect 
of agency explanations for decoupled LTIPs-adopted but 
not implemented-provides a particularly strong test of the 
consequences of symbolic management. 
To control for other variables that might affect these results, 
we also conducted supplementary multiple regression analy- 
ses of excess stock returns (Lubatkin et al., 1989) for those 
firms that adopted LTIPs. In these analyses we controlled for 
prior levels of board control, prior levels of incentive com- 
pensation, and time of adoption. Results, given in the Ap- 
pendix, show that the inclusion of these control variables 
does not affect our hypothesized results: the positive effects 
of symbolic LTIP adoption established in table 2 were not 
different from the effects of substantive adoption, and the 
presence of an agency explanation again provided for greater 
positive effects, even after controlling for symbolic versus 
substantive adoptions.9 
" 
Results of tests for hypotheses 3, 4, 3a, and 4a, on the gov- 
ernance consequences of symbolic actions, are shown in 
tables 3 and 4. Table 3 includes models of CEO/board chair 
separation, and table 4 includes models of increases in the 
outsider ratio. Both tables report a chi-square for these mod- 
els rather than an F statistic because only the asymptotic 
properties of the random-effects estimator are known 
(Greene, 1993). H3 predicted that LTIP adoption, even with- 
out implementation, would diminish the likelihood of separat- 
ing the CEO and board chair positions and increasing the 
outsider ratio. The results support this hypothesis: model 1 
in table 3 shows that the likelihood of subsequent CEO/ 
board chair separation is significantly lower for firms that 
have symbolically adopted LTIPs, and model 1 of table 4 
shows that symbolic LTIP adoption is also negatively related 
to subsequent increases in the outsider ratio. Taken to- 
gether, these results suggest that there is not only a sub- 
stantive substitution effect between the use of incentives 
and monitoring, but also a symbolic substitution effect, 
whereby even a decoupled LTIP adoption can forestall 
changes in governance. 
The results in model 2 of tables 3 and 4 also support H4: 
model 2 of table 3 shows a strongly significant negative ef- 
fect of LTIP adoption on CEO/board chair separation, for 
both symbolic and substantive adoptions, when firms pro- 
vide an agency explanation. Similarly, model 2 of table 4 
shows that symbolic LTIP adoption with an agency explana- 
tion and substantive LTIP adoption with an agency explana- 
tion are both strongly and negatively related to CEO/chair 
separation. In contrast, model 2 of tables 3 and 4 indicates 
that both symbolic and substantive LTIP adoptions without 
an agency explanation are generally not significantly related 
to increases in CEO/chair separation or increases in the out- 
sider ratio. We also used the Wald test to confirm that coef- 
ficients for adoption with an agency explanation were signifi- 
cantly greater than coefficients for adoption without an 
explanation (e.g., chi-square = 5.09 and p < .05 for symbolic 
adoption with an explanation vs. symbolic adoption without 
an explanation in predicting CEO/chair separation; F= 15.98, 
p < .001, for the same comparison in models predicting in- 
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Table 3 
Event History Analyses of CEO/Board Chair Separations (N= 2,569)* 
Independent variablet Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Symbolic LTIP adoption -.825- -.825- 
(.372) (.376) 
Substantive LTIP adoption -1.079- -1.197-- 
(.398) (.444) 
Symbolic LTIP adoption w/out agency expln. -1.021 -1.591- 
(.728) (.834) 
Symbolic LTIP adoption w/agency expln. -1.948-- -2.392-- 
(.729) (.909) 
Substantive LTIP adoption w/out agency expin. -1.534- -2.175- 
(.875) (1.029) 
Substantive LTIP adoption w/agency expln. -3.905-- -4.689--- 
(1.215) (1.449) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption -3.376- 
(1.531) 
Institutional ownership x sub. adoption -6.039- 
(2.073) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption w/out agency expln. -3.318 
(2.525) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption w/agency expln. -8.281-- 
(3.369) 
Institutional ownership x sub. adoption w/out agency expln. -3.605 
(2.692) 
Institutional ownership x sub. adoption w/agency expln. -20.609-- 
(6.59) 
Institutional ownership .516 .217 .530 .227 
(.375) (.180) (.388) (.183) 
Prior board control -.093- -.098- -.078 -.086 
(.043) (.043) (.043) (.044) 
Prior stock option grants -.183 -.201 -.182 -.201 
(.178) (.178) (.178) (.178) 
Return on assets -2.731-- -2.221-- -2.689-- -2.040-- 
(1.055) (.781) (1.061) (.781) 
Log of sales .095 .052 .093 .052 
(.056) (.056) (.067) (.066) 
Constant 1.946w 2.387w 1.961--- 2.367--- 
(.579) (.563) (.577) (.584) 
Chi-square 42.37"0 48.850- 58.12000 69.99000 
* p < .05; *- p < .01; *p< .001. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized 
effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
t Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. 
creased outsider ratio) (Judge and Yancey, 1986). Thus, use 
of an agency explanation for LTIPs decreased the likelihood 
of subsequent increases in board control, irrespective of 
whether the plans were implemented. 
H3a predicted that while institutional ownership may in- 
crease the pressure for governance reforms, such as sepa- 
rating the CEO and board chair positions or increasing the 
outsider ratio, this tendency is dampened when firms sym- 
bolically adopt LTIPs. The results support this hypothesis, as 
evidenced by the significant negative interaction term (insti- 
tutional ownership x symbolic adoption) in model 3 in tables 
3 and 4. Additional results also supported H4a: as the signifi- 
cantly negative interaction terms in model 4 of tables 3 and 
4 show, while institutional ownership can create a force for 
changes in governance structure, under certain conditions, 
LTIP adoptions with an agency explanation (whether imple- 
mented or not) decrease this force; moreover, this interac- 
tion effect is not observed for LTIP adoptions without an 
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Table 4 
Event History Analyses of CEO/Board Chair Separations (N= 4,488)* 
Independent variablest Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Symbolic LTIP adoption -.022- -.021- 
(.013) (.012) 
Substantive LTIP adoption -.022-- -.017-- 
(.009) (.007) 
Symbolic LTIP adoption w/out agency expln. -.017 -.024 
(.013) (.014) 
Symbolic LTIP adoption w/agency expln. -.040--- -.040-- 
(.013) (.015) 
Substantive LTIP adoption w/out agency expln. -.033 -.050- 
(.021) (.025) 
Substantive LTIP adoption w/agency expln. -.065--- -.076-- 
(.021) (.025) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption -.076- 
(.040) 
Institutional ownership x sub. adoption -.419--- 
(.139) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption w/out agency expln. -.061 
(.041) 
Institutional ownership x sym. adoption w/agency expln. -.092- 
(.041) 
Institutional ownership x sub. adoption w/agency expln. -.221 
(.140) 
Institutional ownership x substantive adoption w/agency expln. -.408-- 
(.142) 
Institutional ownership .015 .013 .016 .014 
(.014) (.014) (.015) (.015) 
Prior board control -.002- -.002- -.002 -.002 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Prior stock option grants -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001 
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Return on assets -.006 -.005 -.006 -.005 
(.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Log of sales .001 .001 .001 .001 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Constant .037--- .037--- .038--- .037-- 
(.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Chi-square 25.16--- 28.70000 38.97000 42.94000 
* p < .05; 00p < .01; ...p.. .001. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized 
effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
t Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. 
agency explanation. In addition, we conducted Wald tests to 
confirm that the interaction effect was stronger for symbolic 
adoption with an agency explanation than symbolic adoption 
without an explanation and found the expected significant 
differences for both changes in board structure (e.g., chi- 
square = 4.08, p c .05, for CEO/board chair separation, and 
F= 4.14, p c .05, for increased outsider ratio). Thus, the ten- 
dency for LTIPs to dampen the influence of institutional owner- 
ship on board changes is greater when LTIPs include an 
agency explanation, regardless of implementation. Overall, the 
results suggest that despite the widespread belief that institu- 
tional investors are driving substantive changes in board struc- 
ture to increase the board's capacity to monitor and control top 
management, symbolic actions can forestall such pressures. 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of this study show that the adoption of incen- 
tive plans that symbolically align CEO compensation with 
146/ASQ, March 1998 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 17:28:37 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Symbolic Management 
shareholder interests can have important external and inter- 
nal organizational consequences. First, we found that the 
stock market reacts positively to LTIP adoption whether or 
not the plans are actually implemented. Second, we found 
that using agency language results in a more favorable stock 
market reaction to LTIP adoption, again, irrespective of 
whether the plans are implemented. With respect to internal 
consequences, we also found that appeasing shareholders 
through the symbolic adoption of LTIPs substitutes for other 
changes in board structure that are thought to decrease CEO 
autonomy and increase the board's monitoring capacity. 
Moreover, this effect exists even when the presumed pres- 
sures for such changes are particularly great due to high lev- 
els of institutional investor ownership. 
The results are striking in their consistency across theoretical 
and empirical variations. Rather than focusing on a single 
issue, we identified and quantified two forms of symbolic 
action, the decoupling of formal mechanisms and the use of 
socially legitimate language to reinforce decoupling, and 
tested their impact on two important organizational conse- 
quences. Our predictions were supported for both out- 
comes, and the results also appear robust across different 
time windows for stock market reactions and alternative 
measures of board structure. 
While prior empirical research has examined the presumed 
organizational benefits of conforming to institutional norms 
(Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 
1997), there is very little large-sample empirical research that 
has explored the phenomenon of organizational decoupling 
(Scott, 1995) and even less research examining the conse- 
quences of decoupling. This study is therefore distinctive in 
that we show not only how and why decoupling can en- 
hance organizational egitimacy but also how it affects orga- 
nizational power relationships. Meyer and Rowan's (1977) 
classic thesis on decoupling suggested not only that sym- 
bolic organizational structures could enhance organizational 
legitimacy but also that decoupling led to the persistence of 
organizational relationships (Orton and Weick, 1990). The 
findings of this study are unique in shedding light on the 
consequences of both kinds of decoupling. 
We also contribute to research on symbolic management in 
several ways. First, while prior studies of symbolic manage- 
ment have focused primarily on the use of verbal communi- 
cation to manage impressions (e.g., Salancik and Meindl, 
1984; Brown, 1994; Elsbach, 1994), our study illustrates how 
structural or policy changes (whether decoupled or not) can 
provide a vehicle or opportunity for such communications. 
Kamoche (1995) has noted how organizational reality can be 
socially constructed through a combination of ritual and lan- 
guage. The symbolic adoption of new long-term incentive 
plans may be particularly effective in this regard, because it 
not only meets the specific demands of corporate stakehold- 
ers for greater managerial accountability but also reifies ba- 
sic, meritocratic values and associates them with the CEO 
and his or her decision making. The research reported here 
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could be fruitfully complemented by qualitative research that 
explores how basic social values have driven long-standing 
debates on corporate governance reform. 
In addition, while prior symbolic management research has 
examined how symbolic communications in response to a 
threat to an organization's image or credibility may affect 
subsequent firm performance (e.g., Salancik and Meindl, 
1984; Marcus and Goodman, 1991; Elsbach, 1994), we ex- 
amined how proactive symbolic actions and communications 
affect power and control relationships within the firm. The 
importance of symbolic management to the power differ- 
ences and control relationships in the firm follows from a 
social theory of agency. Specifically, the presence of legiti- 
mate formal policies, together with verbal communications 
that advertise legitimate aspects of those policies, can lead 
to a symbolic resolution of the agency problem, rather than 
an economic or substantive solution, by reducing social un- 
certainty about the alignment of managerial and shareholder 
interests. 
Our findings may shed some light on recent and somewhat 
surprising empirical evidence suggesting that institutional 
investors may have very little effect on actual board decision 
making (Harrison et al., 1994; Kim and Ocasio, 1995). Our 
results suggest that firms may engage in symbolic manage- 
ment as a means of responding to institutional investors' 
calls for visible corporate governance reforms. This interpre- 
tation is consistent with recent evidence that firms with 
more concentrated ownership are more likely to use agency 
explanations for their compensation arrangements (Wade, 
Porac, and Pollock, 1997). To the extent that firms comply 
with the wishes of institutional investors through symbolic 
action rather than substantive change, evidence that the real 
influence of institutional investors is less than expected 
should not be surprising. This is not to say that institutional 
investors have had no effect on corporate governance issues 
in large U.S. corporations, only that their substantive effect 
may be less than would be indicated by the intensive media 
coverage and general public attention. To assess whether 
the growing activism of sophisticated institutional investors 
might temper the market's reaction to symbolic manage- 
ment, we also examined in separate analyses the market 
reaction to symbolic adoption for firms with high versus low 
institutional ownership (split at the median). We observed 
significantly positive excess returns for symbolic LTIP adop- 
tion both for companies with high institutional ownership 
and those with low institutional ownership. Thus, the evi- 
dence suggests that institutional investors are also influ- 
enced by symbolic action. 
While this interpretation assumes that institutional investors 
favor the separation of CEO and board chair positions when 
agency costs are a concern, a combined CEO/board chair 
position could also be said to have symbolic benefits, to the 
extent that combining the positions reinforces the illusion (or 
reality) of unified managerial control (Salancik and Meindl, 
1984). We suggest, however, that today's shareholders are 
more concerned with the opposite problem: the CEO having 
too much control and not enough accountability to the board 
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and to shareholders. Separation of the CEO and board chair 
positions is the change in board structure/composition most 
commonly and strongly demanded by large institutional in- 
vestors like CALPERS (Pozen, 1994) and the Council of Insti- 
tutional Investors (Business Week, 1996). Moreover, these 
preferences are increasingly shared by other external con- 
stituents. In addition, while our theoretical framework ex- 
plains the effect of LTIP adoption on the likelihood of sepa- 
rating the CEO and chair positions, it is not clear why LTIP 
adoption would increase or decrease concern about whether 
the CEO is fully in control. Thus, even if the CEO/board chair 
combination did have symbolic value for firms in our study, it 
would symbolize something different (e.g., the romance of 
leadership) that would neither contradict our theoretical per- 
spective nor provide an alternative explanation for our re- 
sults. 
While this study focuses on the consequences of symbolic 
action for internal control mechanisms (Walsh and Seward, 
1990), there may also be important consequences for exter- 
nal control mechanisms, such as the market for corporate 
control. Future research could extend our approach and find- 
ings to examine whether symbolic governance reforms could 
reduce the impact of sources of external control on manage- 
ment action. For instance, symbolic action might help explain 
recent empirical evidence that the market for corporate con- 
trol does not necessarily lead to substantive improvement in 
managerial efficiency or reductions in managerial entrench- 
ment (cf. Walsh and Kosnik, 1993; Philippatos and Baird, 
1996). 
Future research might also begin to examine the limits or 
the further benefits of symbolic management. For example, 
do firms that repeatedly engage in symbolic management 
across multiple domains or issues develop superior skills in 
this area, with more favorable consequences, or do they de- 
velop a negative reputation for such activities with their tar- 
geted audiences, resulting in less favorable consequences? 
Future research might also address whether symbolic gover- 
nance structures lead stakeholders to view subsequent stra- 
tegic decisions or other organizational outcomes in a more 
favorable light. For instance, one could design a study as- 
sessing whether symbolic information about governance ar- 
rangements affects stakeholders' evaluations of managerial 
motives for acquisition decisions, given uncertainty about 
whether an acquisition is motivated by perceived synergies 
or by the CEO's appetite for personal power, compensation, 
and stability (Marris, 1964; Hill and Snell, 1988). In this way, 
one could consider in greater detail the fundamental ques- 
tion raised in the present study: whether the symbolic man- 
agement of corporate governance changes resolves the 
agency problem in the domain of social beliefs yet perpetu- 
ates existing control relationships, leaving unresolved the 
agency problem in the domain of substantive policy. The fur- 
ther development of a social theory of agency could stimu- 
late a potentially valuable new stream of research on the 
economic, political, and social consequences of actions that 
provide a symbolic, rather than substantive, resolution of the 
uncertainty surrounding divergent interests in and between 
organizations. 
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Symbolic Management 
APPENDIX: Multiple Regression Analyses of Excess Stock Returns for Firms Adopting LTIPs (N= 197)* 
Interval 
Day -1 Day -5 Day -5 Day -5 
Variablest to day 0 to day +5 to day +25 to day +385 
Symbolic (vs. substantive) LTIP adoption -.004 .004 .002 .003 
(.007) (.006) (.003) (.009) 
Agency (vs. no agency) explanation .018 .017-- .009-- .029-- 
(.006) (.005) (.003) (.008) 
Time of adoption .001 .001 .001 .001 
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
Prior board power -.001 -.001 -.001 -.004 
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
Prior stock option grants -.021 -.014 -.004 -.024 
(.018) (.015) (.01 1) (.004) 
Institutional ownership .038- .026- .01 1- .036-- 
(.014) (.010) (.004) (.017) 
Constant .055 .136 .112 .196 
(.119) (.123) (.114), (.206) 
F 3.72-- 3.91--- 3.87-- 4.03-- 
R2 .13 .14 .14 .16 
* p < .05; .p < .01; .'p .001. 
* Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses; t-tests are one-tailed for hypothesized 
effects, two-tailed for control variables. 
t Coefficients for industry and year dummy variables are not reported. 
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